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Women have unique, valuable information and insights that lead to their having different priorities 
and making different decisions than their male counterparts. Despite the fact that women have 
overtaken men in college attendance, there is a gender disparity in high powered positions that can 
be seen in many professions. Male and female lawyers, though exhibiting similar levels of 
competency, are promoted at different rates, exemplifying a trend throughout the world that is also 
closely related to the gender wage gap. The gender promotion gap is a topic that has been widely 
theorized upon, though never fully and satisfactorily explained. This paper assesses a wide array 
of proposed theories on the gender disparity in promotion using a single empirical dataset. I find 
that there is a 13 percentage point difference in promotion between men and women. Women may 
be subject to implicit, self-confirming bias that ends in an equilibrium where women, despite being 
of equal skill level, are promoted less frequently than their male counterparts due to task 
assignment early in their career. Male composition of firm does not affect task assignment, which 
contradicts theories on women’s decision making. Controlling for task assignment does not reduce 
this gap as would be expected from prior literature. Ultimately, I find that the gap is reduced to 6 
percentage points when controlling for billable hours, which are negatively affected by having 
children and spending time doing household chores. However, the persisting 6 percentage point 




 Despite the fact that women have overtaken men in college attendance (Flashman 2013), 
there is a gender disparity in high powered positions that can be seen in many (white collar) 
professions: the corporate and financial world (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010), the political 
sphere (Fox and Lawless 2010), the medical field (Reed et al. 2011), and the legal profession 
(Spurr 1990) to name a few. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that the gender wage gap among 
top executives is at least 45%. Much of this gap is explained by the dearth of female CEOs, Chairs, 
Vice-Chairs, and Presidents and by the fact that females are not executives in large corporations. 
Even in a study solely examining top executives, women are not promoted to the highest positions 
in large firms. Blau and Devaro (2007) find that, in a large sample of establishments, women are 
less likely to be promoted than men, but there are no gender differences in wage growth, “with or 
without promotions.” The objective of this paper is to empirically assess prominent economic 
theories of the gender disparity in promotion.  
 The gender promotion gap is not well understood; it is a topic that has been widely 
theorized upon, though never fully and satisfactorily explained. This paper contributes to the field 
as the first (to my knowledge) to assess a wide array of proposed theories on the gender disparity 
in promotion using a single empirical dataset. Various theories have been proposed to explain the 
gender disparity in promotion, though many have not been fully tested outside of behavioral 
studies and theoretical models; there is no empirical evidence that can fully explain why this gap 
has come about. It is difficult to test these theories in an empirical study because there do not exist 
many natural experiments that lead to random variation in causes of the gender promotion gap. 
This paper seeks to utilize a very rich set of variables that are closely tied to prominent theories of 
gender discrimination. Other empirical studies have not had access to the broad range of variables 
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associated with explaining the gender disparity in promotion. The dataset used in this paper follows 
a large group of lawyers over their professional career, up to the point where they should have 
been promoted to partner. If they have not been promoted by their late career, it is unlikely that 
they will ever be promoted to partner. This dataset is advantageous because it has collected 
information that is extremely important, but not often observable, when assessing theories 
attempting to explain the gender gap in promotion. 
 The theory I endeavor to asses first and foremost is one of statistical discrimination by task 
assignment. Theoretical literature (Coate and Loury 1993, Arrow 1972, Bjerk 2008) would suggest 
that women may be subject to implicit, self-confirming bias that ends in an equilibrium where 
women, despite being of equal skill level, are promoted less frequently than their male counterparts 
due to task assignment and inability or lack of opportunity to signal their skill. I employ an 
empirical dataset that is able to assess this theory because it includes the tasks to which individuals 
were assigned in their early career. Given the literature, I would expect to find significant 
differences in tasks assigned to women and men; however, there is little variation by gender within 
task assignment in the empirical data. Possibly due to this lack of variation by gender, I do not find 
any effect on the gender gap in promotion to be driven by task assignment during individuals’ 
early careers.  
 I then break down task assignment by male composition of firm because experimental 
evidence suggests that women are more likely to volunteer for worse tasks than their male 
counterparts when they are in a group of mixed gender but volunteer with the same likelihood 
when only among other women (Babcock 2016). I am able to assess this theory in conjunction 
with statistical discrimination by task because my dataset includes information on the male 
composition of the firm. Despite finding that the number of women working in male-dominated 
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firms decreases over time, I find that male composition does not cause variation in task assignment, 
and thus does not offer an explanation as to why the gender gap persists. 
  Another experiment suggests that women self-select into worse tasks in order to make 
themselves more attractive in the marriage market (Bursztyn et al. 2017). These women only do 
so when they believe their decisions will be observed by a possible future spouse. The dataset I 
employ contains information on an individual’s preferences for work/life balance, enabling me to 
control for the possibility that women are self-selecting into lower-powered positions in order to 
work less and appear as more attractive candidates for marriage. Though there is little variation in 
task assignment between men and women, I find that controlling for a work/life balance preference 
and utilizing the same male-composition data as above has no effect.   
 The theory presented by Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) provides evidence from data 
on people in the U.S. corporate and financial sectors, suggesting that a possible cause of gender 
wage differences is related to career interruptions, especially due to childbearing. I am able to 
utilize data on career interruptions (and whether or not these interruptions were driven by children) 
to consider the ideas presented by Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010); indeed, career interruptions 
are able to explain part of the gender disparity in promotion. Hours billed offers the largest 
explanation for this promotion gap, explaining about half of the difference in promotion between 
men and women. Children and household responsibilities cause quite a bit of the gender difference 
in billable hours, and thus affect the gender promotion gap through billable hours. 
 Finally, I utilize data determining the region in which an individual resides to proxy for 
sexism to attempt to explain the remaining 6 percentage point gap in promotion. Pan (2015) utilizes 
variation in sexism by region to test correlation between taste-based discrimination and gender 
disparities in occupation. Similarly, I utilize this variation in sexism to assess the correlation 
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between taste-based discrimination and the size of the unexplained gap in promotion. I find that 
there is a negative correlation between the two: when sexism in a region is higher, the unexplained 
gap in promotion is lower, leading me to believe that the gender gap in promotion is driven, in 
part, by a firm’s sexism.  
 This paper finds that no one theory can fully explain the gender promotion gap. Initially I 
find a 13 percentage point gap between men and women who make partner. Despite a rich dataset, 
allowing for the assessment of the most prominent theories of the gender disparity in promotion, 
there remains a 6 percentage point difference in promotion between men and women that cannot 
be explained by any prominent theory or combination thereof. 
 Women and men have different preferences and are thus likely to make different decisions 
affecting the socio-economic sphere (Duflo 2012); this gender promotion gap does not allow for 
these different decisions to be made at a high level, thus reducing the overall impact of women’s 
experiences on society. Esther Duflo (2012) reviews the existing literature on women as decision-
makers and how their different preferences lead to different outcomes. Women who have higher 
relative incomes than their husbands (and thus bargaining power) tend to make decisions that lead 
to larger improvements in child health. It is clear from evidence in household decision-making that 
women have different preferences than men, so as policymakers, women “will prefer policies that 
better reflect their own priorities” (Duflo 2012). Regardless of whether or not these policies result 
in unambiguously positive outcomes for society overall, it is clear that having women in high-
powered roles where they can act on their different preferences will lead to positive outcomes for 
women. Thus, the dearth of women in these high-level positions negatively impacts female 
outcomes. 
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 To the extent that the legal profession is a vehicle for social change it is important for 
women to have a voice in this field. Duflo (2012) relays the importance of the legal environment 
in providing bargaining power to women within marriages through divorce, property, and pension 
laws. If women live in an environment where they are able to get divorced without negative 
societal repercussions, are able to own their own property, and can receive a pension directly, not 
only will unmarried or previously-married women be able to succeed, married women’s bargaining 
power within their marriage will increase and they will be able to enforce their own priorities 
within the household. Additionally, Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010) find evidence that female 
judges make different decisions than their male counterparts and that serving on a bench with a 
female judge can change the way a male judge behaves. The evidence they find points to an 
“informational” premise; “women possess unique and valuable information emanating from 
shared professional experiences” (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010). The gender disparity in 
promotion prevents this information from being used to benefit society. 
 
II. Theories of Gender Disparity in Promotion 
 The gender wage gap has generated to an extremely large body of literature. This paper 
will focus on how differing standards, methods, and rates of promotion have given rise to the 
gender differences in the workforce. This paper builds both on statistical discrimination literature 
and experimental literature on the promotion rate of women. There are a multitude of explanations 
as to why women are promoted to high level jobs less often than their male counterparts. 
 There is an extensive literature that proposes gender difference in task assignment may be 
an important explanation for gender differences in promotion. When a worker arrives at a firm, 
their type is unobservable. Yet firms face an incentive to match workers to tasks that match their 
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abilities. Introspection suggests that if you give a young worker the chance to appear in court as 
1st or 2nd chair or formulate strategy with senior members of the firm and/or clients, it 
substantially increases the likelihood that they would be promoted. Indeed, Xia Li (2016) confirms 
that there are tasks in law firms that are generally considered “good” (see Tables for list of good 
tasks), or on the promotion track. However, firms cannot observe the true type of their workers, so 
they must use other observable characteristics in deciding task assignment. Firms can observe 
output, but this may not accurately reflect ability, rather it could reflect exogenous shocks. Firms 
must continually update their prior beliefs based on signals from their workers and make decisions 
based on threshold rules. There is no restriction on what observable trait may be used by firms to 
infer worker-type. Thus, many models utilize race as an observable characteristic that may predict 
latent ability. 
 Indeed, Coate and Loury (1993) consider how affirmative action affects employers’ 
negative stereotypes. Their model supposes that racial minorities are hired equally to their white 
counterparts and receive equal pay for equal work, but due to affirmative action, the standard for 
hiring minority groups is lower, or perceived as lower, than that for preferred workers. Employers 
have negative stereotypes about these minorities and thus utilize their observable characteristic of 
race to predict their ability. Then race proxies for ability, so minority workers are assumed to be 
“worse” than their white counterparts, and are assigned to worse tasks—less highly rewarding 
jobs. These stereotypes may be self-confirming for two reasons: 1) because there may be a lower 
hiring standard for minority workers, they might actually be less qualified and 2) because they see 
that they are not on track for promotion, they invest less in the company. These minority workers 
observe that they have been given tasks that do not lead to promotion and are incentivized to work 
less. Then the firm sees this outcome and assumes that they were correct in labeling minority 
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workers as less-skilled. Thus, we will reach an equilibrium in which these negative stereotypes 
about minorities are self-confirming, minorities will continue to be given tasks that are not on the 
promotion track, and the racial promotion disparity will continue ad infinitum. 
 Similar dynamics may play a role in the promotional gender gap by utilizing gender as an 
observable characteristic rather than race. My model tests the idea that women are not given tasks 
on the “promotion track” for fear that they will experience more career interruptions than their 
male counterparts. Indeed, this is a common assumption in the theoretical literature. Lazear and 
Rosen’s (1990) gender-specific model of statistical discrimination theorizes that promotion choice 
is based on both ability and a worker’s likelihood of remaining on the job. According to their 
model, “women of equal ability have a lower probability of promotion than men” because, despite 
their level of ability, they are presumed to be more likely to exit the workforce. Thus, women must 
signal greater ability than their male counterparts in order to be promoted. Even if workers were 
able to signal their actual ability, firms may utilize the observable characteristic of gender and 
assign women worse tasks on the assumption that women are more likely leave their job. Because 
women are assigned worse tasks, they may invest less in the company (and towards promotion) 
and are thus more likely to work less, have longer or more frequent career interruptions, and 
possibly drop out of the workforce. This could explain an equilibrium in which women are 
promoted less frequently than their male counterparts. As in Coate and Loury (1993), this 
equilibrium is self-fulfilling, that is, employers expect women to have frequent, lengthy career 
interruptions and so assign them worse tasks, and because they are assigned to worse tasks women 
do indeed have lengthier and more frequent career interruptions. In this type of equilibrium, the 
employer’s observations ex-post match their beliefs ex-ante and it becomes very difficult to deviate 
from this equilibrium that does not truly reflect women’s abilities in the labor market. 
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        My focus on task assignment is driven by the prominence of task assignment in many 
literatures attempting to explain the gender promotion gap. David Bjerk (2008) proposes a model 
of statistical discrimination in which discrimination in promotion practices could occur if 
minorities have: 1) less ability to precisely signal their skill or 2) fewer opportunities for signaling. 
Bjerk calls this phenomenon “sticky floors.” His model is supported by Altonji (2005) whose 
model predicts that sensitivity to skill signaling is dependent upon the skill level of the job. This 
is relevant to the model of statistical discrimination that I test because when women are given 
worse tasks or placed on the non-promotion track they have fewer opportunities to signal their skill 
level and this could act as an additional explanation of why they make partner more infrequently 
than their male counterparts. For instance, it is difficult for a woman to signal her skill as a lawyer 
if she is doing routine research and memo writing, but it may be much easier if she is assigned first 
or second chair. Women who are assigned worse tasks are then less able to signal their skill and, 
because senior partners have less information with which to make decisions, women get promoted 
to partner less frequently.  
        The pattern of promotion and wage inequality persists across a variety of job sectors. 
Malkiel and Malkiel (1973) find that women receive equal pay for equal work, but end up with a 
gendered wage gap due to their lower average job levels.  In 1981 Cabral et al. find that male 
employees in fiduciary institutions tend to be more qualified than their female counterparts, but 
cannot fully explain the difference in compensation. Their data show that women experience 
arbitrary differences from men in both their pay and job assignment. Through the richness of my 
dataset, I can test for possible alternative theories that may eliminate the arbitrariness found by 
Cabral et al. Subsequent research by Olson and Becker (1983) uses the Quality of Employment 
Panel, 1973-1977. They compare constrained and unconstrained estimates to conclude that they 
 13 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients determining promotion for men and women are 
equal. However, they do confirm that when the intercept varies by gender, it is not the same for 
men and women, which could be explained by women being held to a higher promotion standard 
or by employers expecting men to perform better than women when promoted. Thus, all else equal, 
though the returns from promotion are similar for men and women (that is men are not better off 
than women if both are promoted), men are promoted more frequently than their female 
counterparts and the processes by which they are promoted are not the same. 
        Similar research by Cannings (1988) finds that “female managers in one large Canadian 
company are distinctly less likely than their male colleagues to be promoted, and, furthermore, 
that their disadvantage is not primarily the result of differential probability ‘returns’ to particular 
acquired attributes.” My model will be able to confirm that acquired attributes do not drive the 
gender gap in promotion because, as I will show below, men and women look very similar across 
acquired attributes, especially those that predict skill level such as GPA, law school rank, etc. 
Groshen (1991) finds that, across five industries, wages of males and females performing the same 
jobs differ only by one percent and that the largest source of the female/male wage gap is the 
association between wages and proportion female in occupations. She also finds that “even people 
who choose integrated occupations work primarily with members of their own sex” which leads 
to a gender wage gap. My dataset provides information on the individual’s mentor’s gender, which 
will enable me to see if women working closely with other women, or relying on them for help in 
signaling their skill in order to be promoted, can explain any of the gender disparity in promotion.  
A study done on the legal profession by Spurr (1990) finds evidence of statistical 
discrimination. The difference in productivity between male and female lawyers is negligible, but 
the standard for promotion for females is much more demanding than that for males. Spurr utilizes 
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a model in which the standard of productivity is held constant but the probability that a person will 
have achieved y amount of successes is allowed to vary. The standard y needed for promotion is 
56.5% higher for women than for men. Spurr cites reasons for a higher standard of promotion 
similar to those found in Lazear and Rosen’s model: “a higher probability that women will leave 
the firm after being promoted, thereby depriving the firm of valuable firm-specific human capital.” 
My dataset enables me to test for this directly by looking at women’s work experience, history of 
unemployment, and how frequent and lengthy their career interruptions have been. I can also look 
at a variable indicating whether or not an individual plans to stay at the firm for 5 or more years. 
The idea that there is self-selection into tasks is a complicating factor in empirical analysis 
of the gender disparity in promotion. It is difficult to disentangle gender differences in task 
assignment that are driven by firms trying to assign tasks to maximize profits from women self-
selecting into tasks due to their own preferences. In fact, Babcock et al. (2016) conduct a laboratory 
study and find “women are more likely to volunteer, more likely to be asked to volunteer, and 
more likely to accept direct requests to volunteer” for worse tasks than their male counterparts. 
Women are then more likely to end up performing worse tasks. This likelihood to volunteer for 
worse tasks disappears when women are in groups solely composed of women; in fact, their 
volunteer rates become identical to their male counterparts, suggesting that the male composition 
of a firm could be a driving factor in women being assigned to worse tasks.  
 Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017) utilize an experimental survey to test their 
hypothesis that single women in an MBA program avoid career-enhancing actions in order to be 
more appealing in the marriage market. They find that women who are not married or in long-term 
relationships report that they desire a lower salary and are willing to travel less than their married 
counterparts when they believe that their answers will be shared with their male classmates. 
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Additionally, in class assignments where achievements are private, single women score as well as 
their married counterparts, but in public grades (like participation) they score lower. This suggests 
that women who are looking for a partner are willing to sacrifice actions that promote success in 
their careers in order to appear more attractive to possible spouses. These theories of self-selection 
are important because they shed light on different incentives leading to women accepting or even 
requesting “worse” tasks. However, the dataset that I will be using includes information on 
individuals’ preferences for work/life balance, marital status, and satisfaction with task assigned, 
which allow me to control for gender-based selection into tasks that would not usually be 
considered attractive. 
A closely related idea is that potential career interruptions are child-related. Women have 
a comparative advantage in the household and may be more likely to leave their job because, 
compared to their male counterparts, they would be more effective doing household work. This 
may be observed simply by an individual’s gender, and could explain why women may be assigned 
to worse tasks. The dataset I employ includes data on whether women, in fact, do more work in 
the household. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1997) find that the risk of childbearing in Austria 
cannot explain the crowding out of women into lower hierarchical positions. Yet Bertrand, Goldin, 
and Katz (2010) look at the gender wage gaps among professionals in the financial and corporate 
sectors and find that the cause of gender wage differences are related to childbearing. They report 
gender differences due to: a male advantage in training and labor market returns to such training, 
“gender differences in career interruptions combined with large earnings losses associated with 
any career interruption,” and gender differences in weekly hours worked. Additionally, the 
presence of children results in less accumulated experience, greater career interruptions, shorter 
work hours, and earnings declines for women but not for men. Finally, Gangl and Ziefle (2009) 
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find, in a study comparing the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, that motherhood 
results in wage penalties between 9% and 18% per child. 
An additional theory presented by Borjas and Bronars (1989) suggests consumer 
discrimination as an impetus for lower minority wages in self-employment. Because majority 
consumers discriminate against minority suppliers, these minorities must set their price points 
lower. This can be easily translated to consumer discrimination in law firms. If clients do not want 
to work with female lawyers, then these women will bring in fewer clients (and less revenue), thus 
decreasing their ability to make partner in the firm. The data I use includes revenue brought in and 
number of clients both brought in by and working with an individual. I am able to use this data to 
asses a theory of consumer discrimination.  
Discrimination due to gender, though often suggested as a possible explanation for the 
gender disparity in both promotion and wages, is extremely difficult to assess. Pan (2015) utilizes 
regional variation in both sexism and tipping points to test the correlation between sexism and the 
role of tipping in gender segregation in occupations. Additionally, Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 
(2015) suggest that women who have higher incomes than their husbands have less happy 
marriages and are more likely to get divorced. This is truer in regions with high sexism. I will use 
a similar idea to take advantage of the regional variation in law firms in order to test for regional 
taste-based discrimination in the promotion of women to partner. For example, I expect that more 
of the gender based promotion gap will be explained for individuals working in the South than will 
be explained for individuals working in the Northeast because there is more sexism in the South 
than the Northeast. 
Both the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above suggest that utilizing a model 
of statistical discrimination based on a woman’s (perceived) higher likelihood to experience career 
 17 
interruptions due to childbearing could have important explanatory purposes in regard to the 
gender wage gap that seems to have stagnated. Additionally, women could be self-selecting into 
worse tasks due to being in male-dominated firms (possibly in order to appear more desirable in 
the marriage market). The gender disparity in promotion may be driven in part by consumer 
discrimination and accepted gender norms. This paper aims to utilize a uniquely rich dataset to 
assess all of these theories on the gender disparity in promotion. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data 
 The legal profession is a field historically dominated by men. However, since the 1980s 
female participation has increased. Less than 3% of lawyers were female from 1950 through 1970; 
by 1984, they had grown to be 13% of all lawyers and by 2000, women represented 30% of lawyers 
in America (Curran (1986), 25; Schmidt (2000), 1). In 1980, only 13.7% of law school faculty 
were female but by 1986 that had increased to 20% (Chused (1988), 538). By 1996, 43.5% of J.D. 
and LL.B. degrees were awarded to women (Schmidt (2000), 1). This trend mimics national trends 
in white collar positions; women have made progress in traditionally male-dominated fields with 
high salaries. Despite the advances made by women in the legal profession, there is evidence that 
women are not being promoted to the highest level jobs within their firms. 
 The dataset I use is attractive for several reasons; it is the first and only national, 
longitudinal study of lawyers in the United States, the After the JD (AJD). The individuals within 
this dataset were drawn from a nationally representative group of lawyers entering the legal field 
in 2000 who graduated with their J.D. between 1998 and 2000. The AJD only includes individuals 
who entered a state bar in 2000. The AJD utilized a two-stage sampling approach, first selecting 
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to obtain a wide geographic and population size distribution of geographic areas, and then selecting 
individuals who met the requirements of the study within those geographic parameters. Finally, 
the AJD included an oversample of lawyers from minority groups (Black, Latin@, and Asian 
American) (AJD I Restricted Codebook, 3). Due to their sampling approach, the AJD data is 
nationally representative of lawyers in the United States who began their careers in 2000.  
 The first wave of data was collected in 2002 by mail questionnaires, web surveys, and 
telephone follow-up interviews (AJD I Restricted codebook, 4). Wave I of the AJD (hereafter 
referred to as “early career”) had a 71% response rate for a total of 4,538 valid responses 
(Dinovitzer, 90). The AJD national sample matches the expected racial composition of young 
lawyers as would be predicted from results of the 2000 Census. Comparing gender composition to 
that found in American Bar Association data finds very similar results as well (Dinovitzer AJDI, 
90). This allows me to generalize the results of my tests to all lawyers in the United States who 
began their careers in 2000 and provides insight into promotion mechanisms within other white 
collar careers in the United States. The second wave of data (hereafter referred to as “mid-career”) 
was collected in 2007-2008 with a 50.6% response rate (AJDII, 12). This time period represents 
the point in a lawyer’s career when they often decide if they will continue to work in a private firm 
and pursue partnership or leave to a nonprivate firm. Finally, the third wave of data (hereafter 
referred to as “late career”) was collected in 2012 and had a 53% response rate for individuals who 
had previously responded to either AJD1 or AJD2 (ICPSR). The datasets include weight variables 
to account for attrition and ensure the dataset remains nationally representative. After the three 
waves were collected, there are 2,410 individuals who responded in every wave.  
 This dataset is unique in that it follows such a large group of individuals over a long period 
of time. It allows me to follow individuals’ careers as they progress over time and test various 
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theories as to why women are promoted more infrequently than their male counterparts. The 
dataset includes GPA, assigned tasks (see page 39 for a list of tasks), billable hours, interaction 
with senior associates or partners, and whether or not the individual made partner which lets me 
test the theory of statistical discrimination. It includes data on the male composition of firms which 
allows me to look at whether or not women are self-selecting away from promotion due to societal 
expectations. It also includes marital status, number and age of children, whether an individual has 
worked part time due to children or taken parental leave, and hours spent doing household chores 
which allows me to assess theories about childcare on female promotion. Additionally, it contains 
data on how many clients each individual has and has brought in, and how much client revenue 
each individual brings in, which allows me to assess the theory of consumer discrimination. I 
utilize the GSS Male Sexism Index (1977-1998) by region as presented by Pan (2015) to explore 
if variation in sexism by region can explain variation in the gender promotion gap by region. These 
data come from the General Social Survey from 1977 to 1998. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Male and female respondents look very similar across demographics, which is to be 
expected. Table 1 displays the overall mean for demographic variables, the averages for each 
gender, and the difference between male and female means. Men and women are very similar 
across age and marital status. There are slightly more women who are nonwhite than their male 
counterparts, though the standard deviations are quite high and thus this difference is fairly 
negligible. Men and women have no difference in whether or not the job they are in during their 
early career is their first job, and there is no difference in their average GPAs. On average, men 
and women went to similarly ranked schools and have a similar educational debt. Women tend to 
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work in slightly smaller firms and are paid slightly less than their male counterparts in their early 
career, but these differences are negligible. Neither women nor men often make partner in their 
early career, which is to be expected, though there is already slight difference between the two 
groups. These similarities imply that the baseline characteristics and performance of individuals 
should not be driving their differences in promotion rates. 
 Table 2 displays the overall mean for variables that have to do with children and career 
interruptions, these means by gender, and the difference between the means for men and women. 
On average, men have more children than women early in their careers. There is no difference in 
the rate at which men and women work part time, but women work part time in order to care for 
children more often than their male counterparts. Women also work slightly fewer hours per week 
than men. I have included hours billed from men and women during mid-career as the variation 
there is quite stark and is important. Men bill more hours than their female counterparts during 
their mid-careers. The variable “Stay for 5+ years” is used as a proxy for whether or not an 
individual wants to make partner. If they do, they will most likely plan to stay at their current firm 
for 5 or more years. There is no difference in wanting to stay for 5+ years between men and women 
in their early careers. Because there is some variation by gender among number of children, 
working part time due to children, hours worked weekly, and hours billed it is possible that these 
may be causing the promotion gap. 
 Although there is literature that suggests men and women differ along task assignment in 
their early careers, Table 3 shows that men and women actually perform similar tasks. For 
example, men and women are equally assigned to appear in court as 1st or 2nd chair and there is no 
gendered difference between individuals assigned to do routine research and memo writing. 
Moreover, men and women are equally satisfied with the tasks they are assigned, suggesting that 
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women are not being assigned tasks that they feel are worse than those their male counterparts are 
assigned. My ability to observe which task individuals are assigned in their early career is an 
extremely important feature of this dataset. This allows me to test the theory of statistical 
discrimination. However, because men and women do not differ by task, my expectations for the 
results of this theory are somewhat different than what the literature may suggest. However, it is 
possible that task assignment differs depending on the male composition of the firm. I will explore 
this further below.  
 Table 4 displays the average rate of making partner throughout time for individuals overall, 
by gender, and the difference between genders for each stage of their career. Clearly, the difference 
increases. In their early careers, neither men nor women make partner very often, which is to be 
expected. Even so, women make partner less frequently than their male counterparts. By their mid-
career, men and women differ in making partner by 6.4 percentage points. This is the trend I 
expected to find, and the trend that the literature suggests. By their late careers, individuals should 
have made partner if they decided to stay in a private firm. If they have not made partner by their 
late career, it is unlikely that they will make partner. By their late career, men and women differ 
in making partner by 11 percentage points. This trend confirms that women do indeed make partner 
less frequently than their male counterparts and motivates the rest of this paper. 
 Table 11 presents the GSS Male Sexism Index for white-collar workers by region. It is 
clear that sexism does indeed vary by region. For instance, there is more sexism in the southern 
regions than anywhere else in the country. By contrast, the Pacific region has the least sexism. It 




IV. Methodology  
 In this section, I detail the methodology used to assess various theories of the gender 
promotion gap. My definition of promotion is making partner in a private firm but my regressions 
pool private and nonprivate firms for the sake of precision. My main specification is an OLS 
regression model: 
(*) Yi = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Nonprivatei + β3Femalei * Nonprivatei + β4Xi + εi  
Where Yi is a dummy variable for whether or not the individual i has made partner by their late 
career, Femalei is a dummy variable for gender where female=1, and Nonprivatei is an indicator 
for being in a nonprivate firm during the individual i’s early career. I control for being in a private 
firm during i’s early career because there could be gender-based selection out of the private sector. 
Attempting to estimate the gender difference among only those women who remain in private 
firms is extremely difficult, so I utilize an indicator for whether or not the individual is in a private 
firm during their early career. This indicator leads to estimates that can be interpreted as the gender 
differences between men and women who begin in the private sector, that is, those individuals who 
begin their careers intending to join the ranks of those lawyers working in the private sector in 
their late career. This indicates a desire to make partner from early in an individual’s career. β1 is 
the coefficient for the female-male gap for individuals in private firms who make partner, and Xi, 
in the baseline specification, represents a vector of demographic controls including age, a quadratic 
for age, marital status, race, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation in general law review, 
and an indicator for having had a clerkship during law school. I add to this specification a control 
for whether or not the individual planned on staying with the firm for 5+ years as a proxy for 
whether or not they want to make partner, hours billed during their mid-career, hours worked 
during their mid-career, and, finally, task assigned. In order to decrease noise, I add a specification 
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where I control for “good task” rather than individual task assigned. Most of the specifications I 
test will include this baseline specification.   
 I expect β1 to be negative, to reflect the male-female gap in promotion. As I add controls I 
expect β1 to change as these controls explain the gender gap. If it is true that task assignment 
explains the promotion gap, then I would expect that controlling for task will significantly decrease 
the magnitude of β1, possibly to zero. However, based on the (lack of) gender differences in task 
assignment within the data, I do not expect task assignment to have a large impact on β1.   
 I then assess the effect of male composition of a firm on the likelihood of women being 
assigned to better or worse tasks. I utilize a similar OLS regression model, this time including all 
triple and pairwise interactions among Female, Nonprivate, and Male Composition Below Median. 
The dependent variable in this specification varies by column and is each task (1-10), “good task,” 
and partner during late career. In a similar vein, I utilize regression (*), separated by quartiles of 
male composition. Next, I look at the effect of controlling for career interruptions, especially due 
to children. I utilize the same regression model (*) and add controls for work experience, total 
years of unemployment, and various forms of parental leave. Men and women differ over billed 
hours, and I test if this is due to children. I utilize a triple-interaction approach again, interacting 
Femalei, Nonprivatei, and No Childreni (an indicator variable for having children, where having 
children=0). The dependent variable is hours billed in mid-career and β1 is the coefficient for the 
male-female gap in billed hours for individuals in private firms who have children. I then utilize 
an OLS regression to assess the effect of client revenue brought in by an individual on the gender 
promotion gap. This specification is the same as that of regression (*), but I add a control for 
having a female mentor. I use a similar OLS linear regression with multiple interactions to use 
regions as a proxy for sexism to see if the remaining gap is explained by sexism with E. North 
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Central as the base region. I run another version of this regression where I control for the 
importance of work/life balance in accepting a position. 
 Finally, I use a Oaxaca decomposition to reveal the gender promotion gap that is left 
unexplained, even after all of the possible theories I assess. A Oaxaca decomposition exploits the 
fact that regression lines always pass through the true mean (Figure 3). It compares the regression 
lines for two groups (in this case, male and female) by looking at the difference in promotion rate 
between the two. This difference is made up of two parts: the “explained” and the “unexplained.” 
The “explained” part is drawn from the difference in the male mean and female mean for the 
independent variable. The “unexplained” part is the additional difference in promotion rate derived 
from the difference in the slope of the regression line for men and women, that is, the differing 
returns to the independent variable for men and women. I run a Oaxaca decomposition grouping 
by demographics, labor supply, tasks, work/life balance, an indicator for children, an indicator for 
doing the majority of household chores, whether or not an individual had a female mentor, 
variables to control for revenue per client, and region. I run it twice, once with women as the 
primary group and once with men as the primary group. Figure 3 provides the graphical intuition 
behind the Oaxaca method. The mathematical intuition is as follows: !F = "F#F  !M = "M#M !F - !M = "F#F - "M#M !F - !M = "F#F - "M#F + "M#F  - "M#M  !F - !M = ("F - "M)#F +"M(#F - #M) 
Where ! is the mean percentage of males/females promoted given #, the mean input variable for 
males/females. The “explained” part of the Oaxaca decomposition is the coefficient "M, 
 25 
modifying the difference due to men and women’s different endowments. The “unexplained” 
part is the ("F - "M), the differences in covariates given the same input. This particular example 
corresponds to the first two columns in Table 12. The last two columns in Table 12 are weighted 
by #M. I provide weights by male average and weights by female average because it is possible 
that the distribution of women places very few women at the male mean or vice versa, and using 
both weights provides a good check to ensure a correct estimate of !.  
 
V. Results 
Main Results on Gender Difference due to Task Assignment 
 The first theory I test is one of statistical discrimination through task assignment; the results 
are shown in Table 5. The coefficient of interest is Female and column 1 shows there is an 
unadjusted 13 percentage point gap in promotion between men and women in private firms. 
Column 2 adds demographic controls, which do not explain any of this gap, and very little is 
explained when I control for individuals wanting to remain at the firm for 5+ years in column 3. 
This control, wanting to stay for 5+ years, is added as a proxy for the desire to make partner. 
Generally, if an individual is planning to remain at their firm for five or more years, their ultimate 
goal is to make partner. In column 4, I control for hours billed during an individual’s mid-career, 
which significantly decreases the promotion gap to about a 6 percentage point difference. The 
prominent theories of statistical discrimination through task assignment would suggest that 
controlling for tasks should eliminate much of the remaining gap in promotion; women are 
assigned worse tasks due to a firm’s previous beliefs, namely that women will experience longer 
and more frequent career interruptions. Because of these beliefs, women are set on a “non-
promotion track,” which, when observed by female individuals, incentivizes them to invest less in 
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the firm. This causes women to meet the belief that they will experience longer and more frequent 
career interruptions, fulfilling the firm’s hypothesis and leading to a gender gap in promotion. 
However, Table 3 shows that there is little difference in task assignment between men and women. 
Because of this lack of variation by gender, I cannot expect what the literature would suggest, and 
predict that when I control for task assignment, the gap will remain. Indeed, I find in column 6 that 
controlling for task does not explain the gender promotion gap. I control only for tasks 1-4 and 6-
8 because tasks 1-4 are considered “good” tasks, while tasks 6-8 are considered “bad” tasks. In 
column 7, I group these good tasks and control for doing a good task, in order to give slightly more 
power to the variable of task assignment, though it still does not explain the gap between men and 
women making partner.  
 Despite there being little empirical evidence to support the idea that tasks affect women’s 
promotion through the mechanism of statistical discrimination overall, it is important to consider 
the possibility of male composition affecting task assignment. The idea behind this stems both 
from Babcock et al. (2016) who propose that women are more likely to volunteer for worse tasks 
when in a group with men and also from Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017) who find that 
women self-select away from career-enhancing actions in order to be more appealing in the 
marriage market when their male peers can see those actions. Indeed, I find an interesting trend 
when comparing the number of women in male-dominated firms during their early career to the 
number of women in male-dominated firms during their mid-career. We can see in Figure 1 that 
in women’s early careers, fewer work in firms with male composition below the median than do 
during their mid-careers and in women’s mid-careers, fewer work in firms with male composition 
above the median than do during their early careers. Thus, there seems to be a tendency to select 
away from male-dominated firms once women have gained some experience in the legal 
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workforce. Driven by the theory of male composition affecting task and by the trends in my own 
data, I consider how male composition can affect task assignment. 
The first row of Table 6 shows the effect of being a woman in a male-dominated private 
firm on task assignment. If male composition does affect the tasks women are assigned as 
theorized, I expect the coefficient on Female to be negative for good tasks (1-4), and positive for 
bad tasks (6-8). This effect is significant for few tasks, and of the tasks that would be considered 
the worst (tasks 6-8), two have negative coefficients, meaning that women in male-dominated 
private firms are less likely to be assigned those tasks. The pattern seems to make more sense when 
restricted simply to “good task” and “bad task” but these are only significant at the 10% level and 
“bad task” is loosely defined as not being in “good task.” The coefficient on partner agrees with 
the results from Table 4, but is not different from the effect of simply being a woman in a private 
firm. Thus, I conclude that being female in a male-dominated firm does not alter task assignment 
from that of the average firm. 
 Finally, to fully assess the effect of being a woman in a male-dominated firm on promotion, 
Table 7 separates individuals by their firm’s quartile of male-composition. If women were given 
worse tasks in more male-dominated firms, we would expect that controlling for tasks in the 3rd 
and 4th quartiles (columns 5-8) would explain more of the gender gap in promotion than in the 1st 
and 2nd quartiles (columns 1-4), where we should see little to no change. However, there is no 
difference in the gender gap between specifications where tasks are and are not controlled for, 





Results on Career Interruptions 
 Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) find that career interruptions caused by children have a 
detrimental effect on women’s careers. I will now assess how much of the gender gap this idea can 
help to explain. Each column of Table 8 controls for demographics. Column 1 controls for work 
experience, column 2 for unemployment, columns 3-6 for different measures of parental leave (an 
indicator for having taken parental leave, an indicator for having taken parental leave for 3+ 
months, and an indicator for having taken paid parental leave for 3+ months), and columns 7 and 
8 for the importance of work/life balance during early and mid-career respectively. If career 
interruptions, especially those caused by children, explain the promotion gap, I expect to see the 
magnitude of the coefficient on Female decrease when I control for these various forms of 
interruptions. However, none of these variables explain the remaining gap, as is most obvious in 
column 9. Yet they could still be impacting women’s promotion.  
 Because billed hours explains about half of the gap in promotion, in Table 9 I look at what 
effect children have on billed hours. I expect the coefficient on Female to be negative, meaning 
that women who have children and work in private firms bill fewer hours than their male 
counterparts in private firms with children. Additionally, the coefficient on doing the majority of 
household chores should be negative. The mean hours billed during individuals’ mid-career is 
1554.48, so column 1 of Table 9 shows about a 20% loss in hours billed from being a woman with 
children in a private firm. In column 4, I control for number of children and doing the majority of 
the housework, which explains more of the gap in hours billed as well. Being the primary member 
of the household doing chores lowers billed hours by about 10%, but also decreases the magnitude 
of the effect of having children on billed hours (though by less than 10%). The magnitude of the 
coefficient on billed hours gets smaller when I control for whether or not an individual does the 
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majority of the household chores, as some of the difference in billed hours due to children could 
be explained by time spent doing housework. Since having children and doing the majority of the 
housework do cause women to have fewer billed hours, it seems plausible that children do affect 
women’s promotion through their effect on their mother’s billed hours.  
 
Results on Consumer Discrimination 
 Since many private law firms base promotion to partner on whether or not an individual 
will be able to both obtain and retain high-revenue clients for the firm, I look at whether or not 
being in the 50th, 75th, or 90th percentiles of revenue per client has any effect on the gender 
disparity in making partner. If theories of consumer discrimination prove true, the magnitude of 
the coefficient on Female should decrease when controls for revenue per client are added. It is 
possible that these clients are discriminating against female lawyers, which in turn does not allow 
these women to be promoted at the same rate as their male counterparts. In Table 10 it is clear that, 
while revenue per client does affect whether or not individuals make partner, it does not explain 
the gender promotion gap. Column 1 shows the same baseline specification that I begin with in 
each table. Column 2 controls for the gender of the individual’s mentor. If a woman has a female 
mentor, and consumers discriminate against women, her mentor may not be able to help her make 
important connections with clients. Mentor gender does negatively affect individuals’ likelihood 
of making partner, but it does not explain the gender wage gap. Column 3 controls for revenue 
brought in by new clients, which proxies for the ability to obtain clients. It does not explain the 
gender disparity in promotion. Column 4 controls for revenue brought in by old clients: an 
individual’s ability to retain clients. This also does not explain the gender gap in promotion.  
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 In column 6, I control for revenue per client, which has less to do with how many clients 
an individual brings in and more to do with how “important” a client they are. This alone does not 
explain the gender promotion gap, so in columns 7, 8, and 9 I assess whether or not controlling for 
being in the upper tails of revenue per client can explain the promotion gap for women. It may be 
that women can’t draw in clients at this upper tail of the distribution. Individuals who bring in 
revenue per client above the median are significantly more likely to make partner, and this 
increases with the cutoff. Individuals in the 75th revenue per client quartile are more likely to make 
partner than those in the 50th quartile, and individuals in the 90th quartile are still more likely than 
those in the 75th. However, this does not explain the gender promotion gap, leading me to believe 
that, while revenue per client is an important factor in considering promotion, it does cause the 
promotion gap between men and women.  
 
Results on Regional Sexism 
 Finally, I look at sexism by region to see if areas with higher sexism can explain more of 
the gender gap than areas with lower sexism. There are two possible mechanisms at play here. One 
idea is that if sexism is higher in a certain region, firms could be discriminating against women, 
which is why they may not make partner as often. If more of the gap is explained in regions with 
higher sexism, this could be evidence that taste-based discrimination is playing a role. Table 11 
presents the coefficients for the male/female gap in promotion by region, using E. North Central 
as the base region, as well as the white-collar male sexism in that region taken from the GSS Male 
Sexism Index (Pan 2015). Indeed, Figure 2 shows that there is a regional correlation between the 
unexplained gender gap and sexism, suggesting that sexism does play a role in whether or not 
women make partner, though if it is due to the firm is unclear from this regression. 
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Another, less straightforward, mechanism suggests that with higher sexism, women are 
less likely to want to make partner because it may make their marriage less happy. There is 
evidence from Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) that if women become the primary earner, 
their marriages become less happy and more likely to fail. Thus, in a more sexist area, this is more 
likely to occur. In Table 12, I assess the likelihood of this mechanism by including a control for 
how important women consider work/family balance to be when taking a job, using East North 
Central as the base region. Controlling for work/life balance does not seem to have any explanatory 
power, so the explanation granted by using region as a proxy for sexism most likely stems from 
sexist practices by the firm.  
 
Results on the Oaxaca Decomposition 
Thus far, this paper has assessed the most prominent theories on the gender disparity in 
promotion, yet an unexplained gap persists. This suggests that we still do not fully understand the 
socio-economic forces driving the gender inequality in the workforce. Despite the lack of a full 
understanding, it is clear that there is indeed a large gap in promotion that cannot be explained by 
women’s preferences. I have shown that billed hours is the only thing that can satisfactorily explain 
part of the gender promotion gap, and that it is most likely driven by children and time spent doing 
household chores. I utilize a Oaxaca decomposition to more fully summarize how much of the 
gender disparity in promotion each theory explains and what is left unexplained after all theories 
are accounted for. The Oaxaca decomposition can assess the relative importance of the different 
mechanisms suggested throughout the paper for driving the gender promotion gap and display 
what fraction of the gap is explained by each theory. 
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Table 13 displays the results of this Oaxaca decomposition. The first column is the 
explained difference in promotion with women as the primary group. Labor supply accounts for 
most of the explained gap in promotion, which is to be expected because it includes billed hours, 
the only part of the regression with true explanatory power. The second column is the unexplained 
difference in promotion with women as the primary group. Labor supply and an indicator for 
children have the largest unexplained effect on the gender disparity in promotion. This means that 
if women provide the same labor supply as their male counterparts (that is, they have the same 
average work experience, unemployment, parental leave, and hours billed), their returns to labor 
supply are 8% lower than their male counterparts. Similarly, women are punished more harshly 
than their male counterparts for having children; their returns are about 8% lower if they have 
children than if their male counterparts have children. In fact, women make lower returns to labor 
supply, task assigned, work/life balance, children, and household work than their male 
counterparts, but receive higher rewards than men for having a female mentor and bringing in a 
higher revenue per client. These results support the theory proposed by Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 
(2010). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 13 present the same results, but use men as the primary group. 
There is no difference between the two, so I can conclude that the Oaxaca decomposition is able 
to accurately predict outcomes for each group at the other’s mean.  
An important caveat to the results of the Oaxaca distribution is the relatively large 
contributions of missing variable indicators to the gender gap. One possible explanation might be 
that men and women face different time constraints. Thus, women have higher returns to leaving 
questions unanswered in the survey because their missing values indicate that they spend their 
time differently (and possibly more productively) than their male counterparts. We know that 
women spend more time caring for children and doing household chores than their male 
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counterparts, and that they record fewer billable hours. All of these claims to a woman’s time 
contribute to the gender promotion gap and therefore it is plausible that they have less time to 
spend on surveys.  
The contribution of missing variable indicators is especially important to note for the 
unexplained gap. Without controlling for missing values, the unexplained gender gap is 22 
percentage points, but with the controls for missing variables, it is reduced to only 3 percentage 
points. In the regressions run earlier, many of the coefficients on the missing indicator variables 
are very imprecise with large standard errors. Thus, it is difficult to know how to interpret these 
outcomes, as we should not take them at face value due to their statistical imprecision. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 I have examined various theories that attempt to explain the gender disparity in promotion; 
due to the richness of the AJD dataset I have been able to assess the most prominent theories both 
separately and concurrently within one panel dataset. This has allowed me to assess theories that 
have not been widely tested outside of experimental studies. Male and female lawyers, though 
exhibiting similar levels of competency, are promoted at different rates, exemplifying a trend 
throughout the world that is also closely related to the gender wage gap. I find that there is a 13 
percentage point difference in promotion between men and women. This gap is reduced to 6 
percentage points when I control for billable hours. 
 The first theory I tested is one of statistical discrimination by Coate and Loury (1993). 
Although women are as qualified as their male counterparts, they are not given tasks on the 
“promotion track” for fear that they will experience more career interruptions than their male 
counterparts. Because they then observe that they are not on the promotion track, they invest less 
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in the company and do experience more career interruptions, which appear less costly since women 
do not believe they will be promoted regardless. The associates who assigned the women these 
tasks observe their higher rates of career interruptions, which confirm their belief that women have 
more career interruptions, and an equilibrium is reached in which women are given worse tasks 
and promoted more infrequently than their male counterparts. To test this theory, I control for task 
assigned. There is little variation by gender in tasks assigned and performed within the data, and, 
in light of this, it is unsurprising that controlling for task does not explain 6 percentage point gender 
gap in promotion.  
 I then test to see if there is more variation by gender in task assigned if a woman is working 
in a private, male-dominated firm. This stems from a theory presented by Babcock et al. (2016). 
In a laboratory study, they find that men and women are equally likely to volunteer for “worse” 
tasks if women are in a group composed solely of other women, but if they are in an environment 
with men, women are more likely to volunteer for worse tasks. I do not find evidence that being a 
woman in a male-dominated firm leads to assignment to worse tasks. There is no observable 
pattern in task assignment, even related to the male composition of a firm.  
 A model suggested by Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) finds that much of the wage 
disparity in the financial and corporate sector can be explained by women’s longer and more 
frequent career interruptions, mainly due to child-bearing. I control for work experience, 
unemployment spells, and different measures of parental leave in order to determine the effect of 
career interruptions on the promotion gap, but it remains at around 6 percentage points. Bertrand 
et al. also find that gender differences in weekly hours worked (also due to childbearing and child-
rearing) have explanatory power over the gender wage gap. Although I do not find hours worked 
to have a large explanatory effect, I do find that being a woman in a private firm with children 
 35 
lowers billed hours by about 20%. Additionally, being the primary member of the household to do 
chores lowers billed hours by about 10.5%.  
 Borjas and Bronar’s (1989) theory of consumer discrimination postulates that consumers 
are less willing to patronize minorities. Thus, important clients at law firms may select away from 
female attorneys. If these women cannot bring in revenue from clients, they will not be promoted. 
There is no explanation of the gender promotion gap associated with revenue per client, even if 
individuals are bringing in revenue in the 50th, 75th, or 90th percentiles. The gender gap in 
promotion remains at 6 percentage points.  
 I use region to proxy for sexism to see if the explained gender gap in promotion for 
individuals in regions with higher rates of sexism is smaller than for those in regions with lower 
rates of sexism. Indeed, there is a correlation between the sexism of a region and that region’s 
explanatory power over the gender gap in promotion. There is no additional explanation gained by 
controlling for the importance of work/life balance, so I conclude that regional sexism is correlated 
with firms’ promotion decisions causing a gender gap. 
 Finally, a Oaxaca decomposition confirms the fact that, though some of these theories can 
offer a partial explanation of the gender disparity in promotion, none of them (and, indeed, no 
combination of them) can offer a complete explanation. There is still some cause of the gender 
promotion gap that no theory has yet explained. Despite the fact that there is still an unexplained 
gap in promotion for men and women, this paper sheds light on many prominent theories and 
compare them to one another within a single dataset. While I can only speculate on the true driving 
force behind the gender disparity in promotion, there are complex mechanisms at play that 
combine both economic and societal forces. What is clear is that there is a disparity in promotion 
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Task 1: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair 
Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients 
Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview witnesses, or court appearances 
Task 4: Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals 
Bad Tasks 
Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing 
Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing discovered documents 
Task 8: Writing motions or taking depositions 
Neutral Tasks 
Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated 
Task 9: Drafting transactional documents 




Demographic Summary Statistics  
  Early Career   
Variable Total Male Female Male/Female Difference 
     
Age 25.4627 25.6371 25.2876 0.3495 
 (13.4492) (13.4827) (13.4188) (26.9017) 
Married 0.4564 0.4847 0.4281 0.0566 
 (0.4982) (0.5) (0.495) (0.9950) 
Nonwhite 0.2975 0.256 0.3392 -0.0832 
 (0.4573) (0.4366) (0.4736) (0.9109) 
Indicator for First Job 0.6244 0.615 0.6337 -0.0187 
 (0.4844) (0.4868) (0.482) (1.0695) 
GPA 2.245 2.2068 2.2835 -0.0767 
 (1.8302) (1.8003) (1.8597) (3.6604) 
Law School Tier (1-4) 3.1195 3.1412 3.0979 0.0433 
 (1.1884) (1.2424) (1.1324) (2.6372) 
Educational Debt ($) 49169.54 47560.75 50783.68 -3222.93 
 (44080.75) (43464.12) (44650.7) (88120.9691) 
Firm Size (lawyers) 133.4241 139.1334 127.6958 11.4376 
 (305.713) (293.9801) (317.068) (611.4466) 
Salary ($) 62330.74 66340.45 58307.7 8032.75 
 (54847.3) (54910.38) (54510.91) (109422.8617) 
Partner 0.0091 0.0124 0.0058 0.0066 
 (0.0951) (0.1108) (0.0761) (0.8184) 
     
Observations 2410 1207 1203 2410 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
Notes: The first column of data contains the means of each demographic variable for the total sample population. The second column of data 
contains the means of each demographic variable for the males in the sample population. The third column of data contains the means of each 
demographic variable for the females in the sample population. The fourth column of data contains the difference in means of each demographic 
variable between males and females in the sample population. The indicator for first job implies that the job the respondent has while answering 
the survey is their first job in the law field. Most law schools grade on a curve, so actual GPA is less important than noting it is very similar 
between men and women. In Law School Tier, Tier 1 is the best. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics Pertaining to Children and Career Interruptions 
  Early Career   
Variable Total Male Female Male/Female Difference 
     
Number of Children 0.3311 0.4234 0.2386 0.1848 
 (0.7644) (0.8623) (0.6388) (1.5180) 
Part Time 0.0199 0.0108 0.0291 -0.0183 
 (0.1397) (0.1033) (0.1681) (0.2789) 
Part Time due to Children 0.1328 0.0804 0.1854 -0.105 
 (0.9246) (0.7427) (1.0745) (1.8466) 
Hours Worked (weekly) 30.2602 31.4872 29.0291 2.1992 
 (23.0208) (22.8512) (23.1339) (45.9856) 
Hours Billed (in 2006) 668.760 804.872 532.195 272.677 
 (916.702) (972.71) (835.223) (1813.3840) 
Salary ($) 62330.74 66340.45 58307.7 8032.75 
 (54847.3) (54910.38) (54510.91) (109422.8617) 
Stay for 5+ years 0.2498 0.2883 0.2111 0.0772 
 (0.433) (0.4532) (0.4083) (0.8627) 
Partner 0.0091 0.0124 0.0058 0.0066 
 (0.0951) (0.1108) (0.0761) (0.8184) 
     
Observations 2410 1207 1203 2410 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
Notes: The first column of data contains the means of each demographic variable pertaining to children and career interruptions for the total sample population. The second column of data contains the 
means of each demographic variable pertaining to children and career interruptions for the males in the sample population. The third column of data contains the means of each demographic variable 
pertaining to children and career interruptions for the females in the sample population. The fourth column of data contains the difference in means of each demographic variable pertaining to children 
and career interruptions between males and females in the sample population. Stay for 5+ years is an indicator variable for whether or not the respondent wants to remain at the firm for five or more 
years. Hours Billed is from mid-career to provide intuition for why it is important that men and women differ along hours billed.
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics by Tasks 
Variable Total Male Female Male/Female Difference 
     
Good Task .2838 .2833 .2843 -0.001 
 (.4509) (.4508) (.4513) (0.9021) 
Task 1: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair .1137 . 1102 . 1172 -0.007 
 (.3175)  (.3133)  (.3218)  (0.6351) 
Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients .2037 .2071 .2003 0.0068 
 (.4029) (.4054) (.4004)  (0.8059) 
Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview witnesses, or court appearances .1398 .1384 .1413 -0.0029 
 (.3469)  (.3454) (.3485) (0.6939) 
Task 4: Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals .0784 .0787 .0781 0.0006 
 (.2689)  (.2694) (.2685) (0.5379) 
Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated .249 .2428 .2552 -0.0124 
 (.4325)  (.4289) (.4362) (0.8651) 
Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing .0743 .0713 .0773 -0.006 
 (.2623) (.2574)  (.2672)  (0.5246) 
Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing discovered documents .0307 .0232 .0382 -0.015 
 (.1726) (.1506) (.1918)  (0.3448) 
Task 8: Writing motions or taking depositions .1216 .1301 .1131 0.017 
 (.3269)  (.3365) (.3168)  (0.6536) 
Task 9: Drafting transactional documents .0975 .0978 .0973 0.0005 
 (.2967) (.2971) (.2964)  (0.5935) 
Task 10: Handling entire matter on your own .1539 .1533 .1546 -0.0013 
 (.361) (.3604)  (.3617)  (0.7221) 
Satisfied with Tasks Performed .5407 .5352 .5461 -.0109 
 (.4984)  (.499) (.4981)  (0.9970) 
     
Observations 2410 1207 1203 2410 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
Notes: The first column of data contains the percentage of individuals assigned to each given task for the total sample population. The second column of data contains the percentage of individuals 
assigned to each given task for the males in the sample population. The third column of data contains the percentage of individuals assigned to each given task for the females in the sample population. 
The fourth column of data contains the difference in percentage of individuals assigned to each given task between males and females in the sample population. “Good Tasks” include Tasks 1-4. 
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Table 4 
Differences in Partner Rates Across Time 
Partner Rates Early Career  Mid-Career  Late Career Observations 
       
Total 0.0091  .0921  0.2178 2410 
 (0.0951)  (.2892)  (0.4129)  
Male 0.0124  .1243  0.2734 1207 
 (0.1108)  (0.33)  (0.4459)  
Female 0.0058  .0599  0.1621 1203 
 (0.0761)  (0.2373)  (0.3687)  
Male/Female Difference 0.0066  0.0644  0.1113 2410 
 (0.1902)  (0.5750)  (0.8184)  
Standard deviations in parentheses 
Notes: The first column of data contains the percentage of individuals promoted to partner for each sample population during their early career. The second column of data contains the percentage of 
individuals promoted to partner for each sample population during their mid-career. The third column of data contains the percentage of individuals promoted to partner for each sample population 
during their late career. The fourth column of data contains the number of observations per each sample population. 
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Table 5 
Gender Difference in Promotion 
Dependent Variable: Partner during Late Career 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Female -0.133*** -0.130*** -0.124*** -0.0666*** -0.0592*** -0.0581*** -0.0588*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0209) 
Nonprivate Firm -0.308*** -0.257*** -0.262*** -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0368) (0.0365) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0343) 
Female * 
Nonprivate 
0.0824** 0.0738** 0.0727** 0.0439 0.0418 0.0407 0.0413 
 (0.0321) (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0291) (0.0290) 
Stay for 5+ 
years 
  0.104*** 0.0630*** 0.0637*** 0.0635*** 0.0646*** 
   (0.0196) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
Hours Billed    0.000152*** 0.000147*** 0.000144*** 0.000146*** 
    (1.48e-05) (1.50e-05) (1.51e-05) (1.51e-05) 
Hours Worked      0.00113* 0.00111* 0.00109* 
     (0.000644) (0.000647) (0.000646) 
Task 1      -0.0570*  
      (0.0299)  
Task 2      0.0203  
      (0.0232)  
Task 3      0.0412  
      (0.0286)  
Task 4      -0.0338  
      (0.0307)  
Task 6      0.00291  
      (0.0297)  
Task 7      -0.0128  
      (0.0441)  
Task 8      0.0205  
      (0.0285)  
Good Task       0.00981 
       (0.0212) 
Demographic 
Controls 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
        
Observations 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R-squared 0.107 0.132 0.144 0.291 0.293 0.296 0.294 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each column represents the same baseline regression on a dummy variable for making partner during an individual’s late career. Controls 
are added by column. Demographic Controls include age, a quadratic for age, married, nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation 
in general law review, and having had a clerkship during law school. The variable “Stay for 5+ years” indicates whether or not an individual 
planned on staying with their firm for 5+ years. 
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Table 6  
Effect of being Female in a Private, Male-dominated Company on Task 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Task 5 Task 6 Task 7 Task 8 Task 9 Task 10 Good 
Task 
Bad Task Partner 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
Female -0.0184 -0.0202 -0.0335 -0.0120 -0.00419 -0.00644 0.00960 -0.0357* 0.0466** -0.0283 -0.0408* 0.0408* -0.0606** 
 (0.0197) (0.0243) (0.0218) (0.0179) (0.0248) (0.0173) (0.0118) (0.0210) (0.0193) (0.0208) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0243) 
Demographic 
Controls 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
              
Observations 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R-squared 0.212 0.257 0.195 0.096 0.327 0.105 0.046 0.154 0.132 0.323 0.385 0.385 0.292 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each column represents the same regression on the task indicated during an individual’s early career. Column 13 is a regression on making partner during an individual’s late career. 
Demographic Controls include age, a quadratic for age, married, nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation in general law review, and having had a clerkship during law school. 
Good Tasks 
Task 1: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair 
Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients 
Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview witnesses, or court appearances 
Task 4: Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals 
Bad Tasks 
Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated 
Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing 
Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing discovered documents 
Task 8: Writing motions or taking depositions 
Task 9: Drafting transactional documents 
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Table 7 
Effect of Gender on Making Partner separated by Quartile of Male Composition 
 
Early Career 
Dependent Variable: Partner 
during Late Career 
1st Quartile 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 4th Quartile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Female -0.0820 -0.0709 -0.0404 -0.0525 -0.0186 -0.0115 -0.0763*** -0.0800*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0571) (0.0543) (0.0566) (0.0511) (0.0519) (0.0294) (0.0296) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks N Y N Y N Y N Y 
         
Observations 332 332 282 282 316 316 1,480 1,480 
R-squared 0.373 0.423 0.373 0.389 0.379 0.415 0.265 0.272 
         
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Early Career, nonmissing 
Dependent Variable: Partner 
during Late Career 
1st Quartile 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 4th Quartile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Female -0.0820 -0.0709 -0.0404 -0.0525 -0.0186 -0.0115 0.00172 -0.0430 
 (0.0568) (0.0571) (0.0543) (0.0566) (0.0511) (0.0519) (0.0751) (0.0794) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks N Y N Y N Y N Y 
         
Observations 332 332 282 282 316 316 226 226 
R-squared 0.373 0.423 0.373 0.389 0.379 0.415 0.285 0.324 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Mid-Career 
Dependent Variable: Partner 
during Late Career 
1st Quartile 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 4th Quartile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Female -0.0717* -0.0641 -0.0817 -0.0915 -0.0579 -0.0597 -0.0601* -0.0615* 
 (0.0402) (0.0406) (0.0602) (0.0623) (0.0546) (0.0557) (0.0313) (0.0319) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks N Y N Y N Y N Y 
         
Observations 563 563 320 320 418 418 1,109 1,109 
R-squared 0.280 0.302 0.348 0.381 0.250 0.266 0.303 0.307 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Mid-Career, nonmissing 
Dependent Variable: Partner 
during Late Career 
1st Quartile 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 4th Quartile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Female -0.0717* -0.0641 -0.0817 -0.0915 -0.0579 -0.0597 0.0375 0.0274 
 (0.0402) (0.0406) (0.0602) (0.0623) (0.0546) (0.0557) (0.0809) (0.0850) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks N Y N Y N Y N Y 
         
Observations 563 563 320 320 418 418 305 305 
R-squared 0.280 0.302 0.348 0.381 0.250 0.266 0.296 0.312 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Every column represents the same regression on making partner during an individual’s late career. Each regression is restricted to a specific quartile of a firm’s male composition so only 
individuals in firms within that quartile are included. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 do not control for task while columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 do. Demographic Controls include age, a quadratic for age, married, 
nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation in general law review, and having had a clerkship during law school. Control for tasks includes the following tasks: 
Task 1: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair, Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients, Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview witnesses, or court appearances, Task 4: Assigning 
and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals, Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated, Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing, Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing 
discovered documents, Task 8: Writing motions or taking depositions, Task 9: Drafting transactional documents, and Task 10: Handling entire matter on your own. There are many instances of missing 
responses, so quartiles are rather uneven in the upper table, which is why I include the lower table. Only the individuals whose responses are nonmissing are included in the lower table.   
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Table 8 
The Effect of Career Interruptions on Partner 
Dependent Variable: Partner during 
Late Career 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Female -0.0657*** -0.0672*** -0.0555*** -0.0576*** -0.0649*** -0.0710*** -0.0661*** -0.0660*** -0.0542** 
 (0.0207) (0.0202) (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0220) 
Nonprivate Firm -0.124*** -0.149*** -0.126*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.143*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0339) (0.0344) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0339) 
Female * Nonprivate 0.0428 0.0522* 0.0379 0.0400 0.0433 0.0456 0.0428 0.0422 0.0454 
 (0.0290) (0.0284) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0286) 
Hours Billed  0.000149*** 0.000143*** 0.000141*** 0.000149*** 0.000149*** 0.000150*** 0.000149*** 0.000150*** 0.000139*** 
 (1.49e-05) (1.46e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.50e-05) (1.47e-05) 
Work Experience  -0.0440***       -0.0434*** 
  (0.00872)       (0.00873) 
Work Experience Quadratic  0.00191***       0.00189*** 
  (0.000626)       (0.000628) 
Total Years of Unemployment   0.000211      -0.00462 
   (0.00783)      (0.00784) 
Has Taken Parental Leave    0.0227     0.0280 
    (0.0193)     (0.0193) 
On Parental Leave for 3+ Months     -0.00203    -0.00990 
     (0.0253)    (0.0277) 
On Paid Parental Leave for 3+ Months      0.0358   0.0486 
      (0.0302)   (0.0327) 
Importance of work/life balance 
(2000) 
      0.00472   
       (0.0223)   
Importance of work/life balance 
(2006) 
       0.00554 0.00450 
        (0.0199) (0.0194) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
          
Observations 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R-squared 0.295 0.327 0.303 0.296 0.295 0.296 0.295 0.295 0.333 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each column represents the same baseline regression on a dummy variable for making partner during an individual’s late career. Controls are added by column. Demographic Controls include 
age, a quadratic for age, married, nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation in general law review, clerkship, stay for 5+ years. Control for tasks includes the following tasks:  
Task 1: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair, Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients, Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview witnesses, or court appearances, Task 4: Assigning 
and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals, Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated, Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing, Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing 
discovered documents, Task 8: Writing motions or taking depositions, Task 9: Drafting transactional documents, and Task 10: Handling entire matter on your own. 
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Table 9 
Effect of Children on Billed Hours 
Dependent Variable: Hours Billed (in 
2006) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Female -347.4*** -350.9*** -287.7*** -291.6*** 
 (64.81) (65.72) (66.50) (67.37) 
Nonprivate Firm -682.6*** -683.7*** -679.0*** -680.4*** 
 (89.44) (89.54) (89.21) (89.30) 
No Children -81.33 -99.45 -59.26 -79.72 
 (68.87) (88.85) (68.96) (88.84) 
Female * Nonprivate 147.7 148.9 142.3 143.7 
 (95.40) (95.50) (95.16) (95.25) 
Female * No Children 94.42 98.00 48.16 52.21 
 (97.27) (97.92) (97.86) (98.50) 
Nonprivate * No Children 39.09 39.62 40.09 40.71 
 (97.25) (97.28) (97.00) (97.03) 
Female * Nonprivate * No Children 25.30 24.15 27.90 26.59 
 (137.0) (137.1) (136.7) (136.7) 
Number of Children  -9.221  -10.41 
  (28.56)  (28.49) 
Does Majority of Household Work   -162.4*** -162.4*** 
   (44.30) (44.31) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R-squared 0.189 0.190 0.195 0.195 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each column represents the same baseline regression on hours billed during an individual’s mid-career. Controls are added by column. Demographic Controls include age, a quadratic for age, 
married, nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation in general law review, clerkship, stay for 5+ years. The mean hours billed during individuals’ mid-career is 1554.48, col. 1 shows about 
a 20% loss in hours billed from being a woman with children in a private firm. Col. 4 shows about a 10% loss in hours billed from doing the majority of the household work, but also decreases the 
magnitude of the effect of having children on billed hours (though by less than 10%).
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Table 10 
Effect of Mentor Gender and Revenue brought in by Client on Partner Rates 
Dependent Variable: 
Partner during Late Career 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Female -0.0657*** -0.0609*** -0.0570*** -0.0618*** -0.0608*** -0.0617*** -0.0608*** -0.0601*** -0.0615*** -0.0605*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
Nonprivate Firm -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.125*** -0.126*** -0.127*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) 
Female * Nonprivate 0.0428 0.0482* 0.0396 0.0418 0.0419 0.0427 0.0392 0.0392 0.0414 0.0396 
 (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
Hours Billed (in 2006) 0.000149*** 0.000142*** 0.000153*** 0.000143*** 0.000146*** 0.000147*** 0.000141*** 0.000144*** 0.000146*** 0.000140*** 
 (1.49e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.47e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.50e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.50e-05) 
Female Mentor  -0.0661***         
  (0.0201)         
Revenue brought in by 
new clients 
  3.61e-07***        
   (6.97e-08)        
Revenue brought in by old 
clients 
   3.36e-08*       
    (2.01e-08)       
Total revenue brought in 
by clients 
    6.23e-08***      
     (1.89e-08)      
Total revenue brought in 
per client 
     2.30e-07**    1.04e-07 
      (9.75e-08)    (1.15e-07) 
50th Percentile of revenue 
per client 
      0.118***   0.0777 
       (0.0363)   (0.0482) 
75th Percentile of revenue 
per client 
       0.144***  0.0412 
        (0.0472)  (0.0718) 
90th Percentile of revenue 
per client 
        0.181** 0.0433 
         (0.0721) (0.0971) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
           
Observations 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R-squared 0.295 0.300 0.309 0.299 0.303 0.301 0.303 0.302 0.302 0.304 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each column represents the same baseline regression on a dummy variable for making partner during an individual’s late career. Controls are added by column. Demographic Controls include 
age, a quadratic for age, married, nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation in general law review, clerkship, stay for 5+ years. Control for tasks includes the following tasks:  
Task 1: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair, Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients, Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview witnesses, or court appearances, Task 4: Assigning 
and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals, Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated, Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing, Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing 
discovered documents, Task 8: Writing motions or taking depositions, Task 9: Drafting transactional documents, and Task 10: Handling entire matter on your own.
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Table 11 




GSS Male Sexism Index:  
White Collar Sexism  
   
New England 0.167 -0.241 
 (0.0629)  
Middle Atlantic -0.116 -0.083 
 (0.181)  
E. North Central (Base Region) -0.112 -0.162 
 (0.0397)  
W. North Central 0.0427 -0.125 
 (0.0879)  
South Atlantic -0.0231 -0.027 
 (0.0595)  
E. South Central -0.0138 -0.019 
 (0.129)  
W. South Central 0.122 -0.032 
 (0.0624)  
Mountain Division 0.0966 -0.06 
 (0.245)  
Pacific 0.230 -0.117 
 (0.0947)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: This table displays the coefficient for male/female promotion gap by region using E. North Central as the base region, and each region’s 
measure of white collar sexism. This Male Sexism index comes from that used by Pan (2015). She reports that “the GSS Male Sexism Index is 
constructed based on male answers to the full set of eight gender-related questions in the General Social Survey in [sic] from 1977 to 1998.” The 
white-collar index “restricts the index to males whose reported occupation in the GSS is white-collar.” 
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Table 12 
Importance of Work/Life Balance on Regional Explanation 
Dependent Variable: Partner during Late Career (1) (2) (3) 
    
Female -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0397) 
Importance of work/life balance in early career  -0.00494  
  (0.0224)  
Importance of work/life balance in mid-career   0.00208 
   (0.0199) 
Demographic Controls Y Y Y 
Control for Tasks Y Y Y 
    
Observations 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R-squared 0.314 0.314 0.315 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each column represents the same baseline regression on a dummy variable for making partner during an individual’s late career. Controls 
are added by column. Demographic Controls include age, a quadratic for age, married, nonwhite, firm size, law school rank, GPA, participation 
in general law review, clerkship, stay for 5+ years. This regression uses E. North Central as the base region. Each specification includes triple 
interactions for region, gender, and nonprivate firm. This is the specification used to obtain coefficients for how much of the gender gap is 
explained by region. Regions defined by U.S. Census Bureau, see Figure 4 for map. Control for tasks includes the following tasks: Task 1: 
Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair, Task 2: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients, Task 3: Traveling to meet clients, interview 
witnesses, or court appearances, Task 4: Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals, Task 5: Responsible for keeping client updated, 
Task 6: Work limited to routine research and memo writing, Task 7: Spending 100+ hours reviewing discovered documents, Task 8: Writing 
motions or taking depositions, Task 9: Drafting transactional documents, and Task 10: Handling entire matter on your own. 
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Table 13 
Oaxaca Decomposition on Gender Promotion Gap 
 !F-!M !M-!F 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Explained Gap Unexplained Gap Explained Gap Unexplained Gap 
Demographics 0.0042647 0.7481961 -0.0042647 -0.7481961 
Labor Supply -0.0523547 -0.0821121 0.0523547 0.0821121 
Tasks 0.0017127 -0.0254945 -0.0017127 0.0254945 
Work/Life Balance -0.0018335 -0.061289 0.0018335 0.061289 
Kids 0.0037993 -0.080317 -0.0037993 0.080317 
Household Work -0.0034282 -0.0335841 0.0034282 0.0335841 
Female Mentor -0.0107309 0.0054565 0.0107309 -0.0054565 
Client Revenue -0.0105624 0.0246144 0.0105624 -0.0246144 
Region -0.0017271 0.0059144 0.0017271 -0.0059144 
Missing -0.0316526 0.1867281 0.0316526 -0.1867281 
Constant  -0.7227094  0.7227094 
Total (Without Missing) -0.0708601 -0.2213247 0.0708601 0.2213247 
Total (Including Missing) -0.1025127 -0.0345966 0.1025127 0.0345966 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 display the results from a Oaxaca decomposition on the gender promotion gap (the dependent variable being a dummy for making partner during an individual’s late career) 
using female as the baseline mean. Columns 3 and 4 display the results from a Oaxaca decomposition on the gender promotion gap (the dependent variable being a dummy for making partner during an 
individual’s late career) using male as the baseline mean.




Notes: Wave 1 is women with nonmissing values for male composition of firm during their early career and Wave 2 is women with nonmissing values for male composition of firm during their mid-
career. Each line shows the number of women in firms with the corresponding percent male. In women’s early careers, fewer work in firms with male composition below the median than do during their 
mid-careers and in women’s mid-careers, fewer work in firms with male composition above the median than do during their early careers.
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Figure 2 
 
Notes: This graph displays a scatter plot of the unexplained gap in promotion against the GSS Male Sexism Index for White-collar workers by region. There is a negative correlation between seism and 
the unexplained gender gap in promotion.  
  57 
Figure 3 
 
Notes: This graph is purely for demonstration purposes to provide intuition into how a Oaxaca decomposition works. It is not demonstrative of actual results in this paper.  
  58 
Figure 4 
 
Notes: Map created by the U.S. Census Bureau. It is in the public domain. According to the sexism index utilized by Pan (2015), white collar sexism is highest in the southern regions and lowest in New 
England. 
